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Tobias: The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity

THE IMMINENT DEMISE OF INTERSPOUSAL
TORT IMMUNITY
Carl Tobias*

During the decade of the 1980s, I extensively explored the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity in the United States.' I
examined the origins and development of the concept; how the
notion survived intact in every jurisdiction throughout the
nation until 1914; the first successful efforts to abolish
immunity during the teens; the slow pace of abrogation in the
five decades between 1920 and 1970; and the steady decline of
the doctrine thereafter.
Indeed, only a small number of states in the country still
retain any form of interspousal tort immunity, even though
some jurisdictions evince concern about certain issues involving
the doctrine. Illustrative are questions implicating the validity
of family exclusion clauses in insurance policies whose
application can have the effect of retaining immunity and the
issue of whether a divorced spouse can maintain a personal
injury suit in intentional tort separate from a marital
dissolution action. 2
I also analyzed all of the major public policy arguments
articulated in favor of immunity's retention and the important
policy contentions enunciated for its abolition. I concluded that
none of the ideas espoused for retaining immunity - such as
preservation of marital harmony as well as prevention of fraud
and collusion and the pursuit of frivolous litigation - had much
validity and recommended that the doctrine be completely
abrogated. However, I acknowledged that abolition would not
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte
Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing
support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359
(1989).
2. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1982); Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d
1189, 1196 (N.J. 1979); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (Ohio 1987).
See generally LEONARD KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS:

FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND

SEXUAL ABUSE (1994).
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substantially improve conditions for women in the United
States.
In the course of that research, I searched for patterns
relating to the immunity doctrine. The material in the first
paragraph of this essay illustrates temporal dimensions which
were relevant to interspousal immunity's retention and
abrogation. More specifically, the rise of the women's movement
and its culmination in winning the suffrage during the teens
may explain the early group of decisions which overruled the
doctrine. The relative quiescence of the women's movement over
the succeeding four decades seems to explain the slow pace of
abolition in that period, while the revitalization of the
movement during the mid-1960s appears to explain the
doctrine's rapid decline from 1970 until the present. These
explanations have some surface plausibility, although they may
be too "structuralist."
Numerous other factors, such as
developments in the relevant areas of substantive tort law
involving, for instance, its compensatory purpose, are at least as
persuasive.
I searched for additional patterns in my research on
interspousal tort immunity. Another avenue was the notion of
geographic patterns. I was cognizant of the legendary William
Prosser's suggestion that courts in the South and West tended to
be more conservative, particularly in matters involving personal
honor and chivalry.3
My preliminary efforts to detect
geographical patterns, however, failed to yield much material
4
that I considered particularly meaningful.
I want to revisit that possibility and to explore other ideas
in this essay primarily by tracing the rise and demise of
interspousal tort immunity in the jurisdictions of Montana and
Virginia. I have selected Montana and Virginia for several
reasons. Each may serve as a surrogate for its respective region,
even if neither is necessarily a perfect representative. Tracing
the doctrine in the two states might reveal patterns or at least
afford helpful insights that could be applied to seek immunity's
abolition in the few jurisdictions that cling to this antiquated
concept. I am also familiar with the jurisprudence of each state,
and I feel relatively comfortable with the local legal cultures and
broader cultures of the two jurisdictions. I am a member of the
3.

See JOHN

W.

WADE ET AL., PROSSER,

WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND

MATERIALS ON TORTS 104-05 (9th ed. 1994); see also Fox Butterfield, Why America's
MurderRate is So High, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, § 4 at 1.
4. See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 409-22.
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bars in Montana and Virginia, while I lived much of my adult
life in Montana and most of my earlier years in Virginia.
I. MONTANA

Although states began recognizing interspousal tort
immunity as early as 1863, Montana did not adopt the doctrine
until 1932. 5 The Montana Supreme Court relied substantially
on the notion that a woman's legal identity merged into her
husband's upon marriage, the common law rule against
interspousal tort suits which could only be changed by a Married
Women's Act, and the determination that the Montana
6
legislation was not meant to modify the doctrine.
Subsequent opinions issued the following year and in 1968
simply cited the earlier precedent and depended on legislative
inaction respecting tort immunity.7
In 1975, the Montana
Supreme Court reiterated that the Married Women's measure
failed to authorize interspousal tort claims and proclaimed that
the doctrine's abolition was a public policy issue that should be
left to the legislature, which is the appropriate entity to
ascertain and prescribe public policy.8 It is interesting to note
that women whose husbands' negligent driving injured them
brought each of these four cases. 9
Before 1979, no woman had ever pursued an intentional tort
suit against her husband in Montana that resulted in the
issuance of a reported judicial opinion. The 1979 session of the
Montana Legislature abrogated the immunity for intentional
torts in the context of enacting legislation, the primary purpose
of which was to rectify or ameliorate the problem of spousal
abuse. 10
In 1986, the Montana Supreme Court abolished
5. See Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932). In this section of the
essay, I rely on Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in Montana, 47 MONT. L. REV.
23, 27-29 (1986).
6. See Conley, 92 Mont. at 438-40, 15 P.2d at 925-26. The court relied somewhat
on the notion that permitting litigation would disrupt marital harmony and on the idea
that the court should defer to the legislature on this issue. See id. at 440, 15 P.2d at 926.
7. See Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933); State ex rel. Angvall v.
District Court, 151 Mont. 483, 484-86, 444 P.2d 370, 370-71 (1968). The two decisions
treat legislative inaction as important to, if not dispositive of, the immunity issue.
8. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 485-86, 544
P.2d 444, 446-47 (1975).
9. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 27 n.24.
10.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-109 (1997); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 28 &

n.31.
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interspousal tort immunity in negligence actions.1 1 The court
found the concept of unity between husband and wife to be
outmoded and that statutory and case law had significantly
eroded the notion. 12 The Montana Supreme Court also stated
that the filing of civil litigation would not destroy family
harmony in a sound family and remarked that this was
particularly true when redress was sought against the spouses'
insurance company. 13 The court correspondingly rejected the
argument that husbands and wives would engage in fraud and
collusion, suggesting that judges and juries can ascertain
14
whether spouses are participating in that type of behavior.
II. VIRGINIA
In a 1918 case, a woman intentionally injured by her
husband asked the Virginia Supreme Court to find that the 1877
Married Women's Act permitted tort litigation between
spouses. 15 The court rejected her request, finding that the
legislation did not afford married women a new cause of action
but only expanded remedies which those women already
16
possessed at common law.
During 1952, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to permit
a tort suit by a woman to recover for personal injuries which her
spouse inflicted on her before their marriage. 17 The court
determined that the common law rule precluded liability for
prenuptial personal injuries.' 8 Three years later, however, the
Supreme Court did allow a husband to recover from his wife for
a property tort.19
The Virginia Supreme Court began partially abrogating
interspousal tort immunity for negligent torts in 1971. The
court permitted the administrator of a deceased woman's estate
to pursue a wrongful death action against the husband, who had

11. See Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).
12. See id. at 218-19, 721 P.2d at 345.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'r, 96 S.E. 315 (Va. 1918). In this section of
the essay, I rely on Lisa Anderson-Lloyd, Comment, The Legislative Abrogation of
InterspousalImmunity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1981).
16. See Keister, 96 S.E. at 317.
17. See Furey v. Furey, 71 S.E. 2d 191 (Va. 1952).
18. See id. at 192.
19. See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 89 S.E.2d 69 (Va. 1955).
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killed her in an automobile accident. 20 The court characterized
the common law notion of unity as an "outmoded concept" which
would not prevent suit. 21 It also rejected the major public policy
reasons that judges had announced in support of the immunity
doctrine. The Virginia Supreme Court found that the existence
of insurance minimized any threat to family harmony and that
the potential for fraud and collusion between husbands and
wives was insufficient to preclude recovery for personal
22
injuries.
In a 1975 case, the court adopted another exception to tort
immunity by allowing the administrator of an estate to pursue a
wrongful death action for the deceased's parents and brothers
against the husband's committee. 23 The court did recognize the
public policy of promoting connubial tranquility but determined
that it was inapplicable when one spouse's intentional act ended
the marriage and the "deceased spouse is survived by no living
24
child or grandchild."
In a notorious 1980 case, however, the Virginia Supreme
Court refused to abrogate interspousal immunity for an
intentionally inflicted tort.25 A woman hired a third party to
murder her husband. While the third party failed to kill the
husband, the third party succeeded in severely injuring the
husband. 26 The husband divorced his wife and filed a tort suit
soon thereafter.
The court asserted that permitting damage actions in this
context "would contribute to the disruption of many marriages"
because of the incentive to sue for personal injuries 27 and
refused to add another "abrasive and unnecessary ingredient" to
the connubial relationship. 28 The Virginia Supreme Court also
resuscitated earlier policy arguments, observing that redress in
criminal or divorce courts afforded adequate relief and evincing
concern about a flood of frivolous or trivial litigation over petty
conjugal grievances. 29

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971).
Id. at 202.
See id.
See Korman v. Carpenter, 216 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1975).
See id. at 198.
See Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1980).
See id. at 895-96.
Id. at 897-98.
Id. at 898.
See id. at 898 n.4.
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The next year, the Virginia General Assembly passed
legislation abrogating interspousal tort immunity. The statute
provided that the "common law defense of interspousal
immunity in tort is abolished and shall not constitute a valid
defense to any such cause of action arising on or after July 1,
1981."30
III. MONTANA AND VIRGINIA
These stories of the rise and fall of interspousal tort
immunity in Montana and Virginia exhibit some common
themes. Both states recognized the doctrine relatively late in its
existence and for rather similar public policy reasons. The two
jurisdictions fully abrogated negligence immunity within the
same decade, while the state legislatures essentially abolished
intentional tort immunity.
Yet there were important differences. At the same time
that the Montana Legislature eliminated intentional tort
immunity to protect wives from spousal abuse, the Virginia
Supreme Court decided to retain this immunity for antiquated
reasons implicating the preservation of marital harmony only to
have the state legislature fully abrogate the doctrine the
following year.
The legislatures of the two jurisdictions, although reaching
the same conclusion, apparently passed these statutes for
dissimilar reasons. Montana treated immunity's abolition as a
women's rights issue, enacting the measure as a component of a
package aimed at spousal abuse, while Virginia principally
reacted to an archaic judicial decision. The state supreme courts
partially eliminated immunity in specific contexts, but the state
legislatures
in
each
jurisdiction
shared
substantial
responsibility for the doctrine's complete abolition.
The timing and manner of interspousal tort immunity's
abrogation in Montana and Virginia illuminate minimally
Professor Prosser's suggestion that courts in the South and the
West tend to be conservative, especially as to issues of chivalry
and personal honor. 31 First, it is unclear what conservative
means in the immunity context. For example, both the Montana
stereotype of independent, self-reliant frontier women and the
Virginia stereotype of southern belles could have been
instrumental in eliminating the doctrine much earlier than was
30.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Michie 1997).

31.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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done out of respect for women or to protect them. Second, the
concepts of chivalry and personal honor do not explain why each
jurisdiction waited so long to permit intentional tort suits
against wife batterers who had treated their spouses in the least
chivalrous and honorable manner imaginable. Of course, some
issues related to the timing of the doctrine's demise are random
and merely reflect when plaintiffs were willing to bring, and
attorneys were willing to file, cases.
The growing recognition of women's rights and the revival of
the women's movement may partially explain the complete
abolition of the doctrine in the two states during the 1980s.
Developments in substantive tort law, and perhaps in family
law-because interspousal immunity was apparently more a
family, than a tort, law doctrine 32-probably
afford better
explanations. After all, liability was rapidly expanding across a
broad front of substantive tort law doctrines during the relevant
period. Examples include: the closely related parent-child
immunity; other immunities pertaining to the government and
to charities; the evolution of products liability from negligence to
warranty to strict liability; and the merger of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk as complete defenses into
33
comparative negligence.
In short, Montana and Virginia abolished interspousal tort
immunity in certain similar, and some different, ways. Neither
jurisdiction may serve particularly well as a surrogate for its
region. For instance, numerous states in the Rocky Mountains
and the Northern Plains abrogated the immunity earlier in time
and more comprehensively than Montana. 34 Illustrative are
Colorado35 and North Dakota 36 which completely eliminated the
doctrine in the 1930s and Idaho37 and South Dakota 38 that did so
in the 1940s. Moreover, North Carolina and South Carolina,
Virginia's rather close neighbors, and Alabama in the deep
South were among the seven states whose supreme courts
abolished interspousal tort immunity in the teens, 39 even as the
32. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 394-98.
33. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 437-38.
34. These states abolished interspousal tort immunity for intentional and
negligent torts while Montana's abolition was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion.
35. See Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1935).
36. See Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932).
37. See Lorang v. Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1949).
38. See Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266 (S.D. 1941).
39. See Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335, 338 (Ala. 1917); Crowell v. Crowell, 105
S.E. 206, 210 (N.C. 1920); Prosser v. Prosser, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (S.C. 1920); see also

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1999

7

108

MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
60 [1999],
Iss. 1, Art. 5
LAW
REVIEW

Vol. 60

evolution of the doctrine's abrogation in the contiguous, border
states of Maryland and West Virginia resembles developments
in Virginia, 40 while the southern states of Florida and Georgia
41
have been among the last to eliminate immunity.
Finally, the somewhat tortured paths to abolition that
unfolded in the two states may afford insights for individuals
and organizations, such as married women harmed by their
husbands and women's rights groups in those jurisdictions that
have not yet totally abolished interspousal tort immunity.
Perhaps most important, the developments in Montana and
Virginia suggest that the most effective route to comprehensive
reform is through legislation. Proponents of abrogation should
tout these bills as facilitating the vindication of women's rights
or as the appropriate elimination of a doctrine that has outlived
any validity that it may have had. In states where abolition's
advocates cannot persuade legislatures to jettison the immunity,
proponents should pursue tort litigation seeking abrogation and
rely on criticisms of the major policy arguments respecting
marital harmony, fraud and collusion and frivolous and trivial
suits articulated in Montana and Virginia as well as numerous
other jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION

This survey of one substantive tort law doctrine that is
significant to women illustrates several ideas. It indicates that
developments in that substantive field may have been more
important to abolition than the women's movement or women's
rights arguments.
The review shows that a number of
similarities and some differences attended abrogation in the two
jurisdictions, which are rather representative of their regions. It
demonstrates the difficulty of finding very precise temporal or
geographical patterns. The treatment affords as well proposals
for reform in state legislatures and courts and suggests
strategies for fully abolishing the doctrine.

Tobias, supra note 1, at 409-22.
40. See Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 (Md. 1978); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244
S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); see also supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §741.235 (West 1997); Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d
1360 (Fla. 1993); Shoemake v. Shoemake, 407 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. 1991).
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